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Antitrust Aspects of
Recent Transportation Mergers
In the transportationindustry the enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act is, for practicalpurposes, left
to the respective regulatory agencies; for their approval
of a merger grants immunity from the antitrust laws.
The Interstate Commerce Commission may approve a
carrier merger if it is "consistent with the public interest.'" The Civil Aeronautics Board, on the other hand,
cannot approve an airline merger that would create a
monopoly. The powerful merger movement of the past
decade in the transportationindustry has brought the
agency process of balancing the TransportationAct and
the antitrust laws to the foreground. In this Article,
ProfessorFulda examines the interplay between competition and regulation in recent agency decisions; he focuses
on the apparent lukewarm attitude toward competition
of the ICO, in contrast with the desire to promote intermode competition of the CAB. Professor Fulda suggests.
that Congress correct the current "mood" toward intermode competition of the ICC, perhaps by an antimonopoly proviso similar to that governing the CAB.

Carl H. Fulda*
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Prevention of mergers with anticompetitive tendencies or
effects is one of the foremost antitrust problems of our day,' not
only in the free sector of the economy, which is subject to section
7 of the Clayton Act, but also in the regulated industries of
transportation and banking, where enforcement of section 7 is
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. This Article is an enlarged version of a talk given on December 29, 1963 at the Round Table on Trade
Regulation, Association of American Law Schools, Los Angeles, California.

1. See SECION OF ANTUST LAw, Az.imuc~ BAR Ass',, Mi nn CASE
DIGEST (1963); Handler & Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the CellerKefauver Antimerger Act, 61 COLuxi. L. Rnv. 629 (1961).

2. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
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entrusted to the respective regulatory agencies.' With regard to
transportation, there are other enactments relating to mergers
and consolidations which, for practical purposes, supersede the
Clayton Act: Thus, section 408(a) of the Federal Aviation Act 4
prohibits mergers of air carriers "unless approved by order of the
[Civil Aeronautics] Board," and section 414 of the same statute'
relieves from the operations of the antitrust laws- which, of
course, include section 7 of the Clayton Act - all persons affected
by such an order. In other words, by its approval the CAB may
legalize a merger of airlines which, but for such approval, would
violate the Clayton Act. The CAB's power in granting such an
antitrust exemption, however, is curtailed by section 408(b): Approval of any merger "which would result in creating a monopoly
or monopolies and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize
another air carrier not a party to the . . .merger" is expressly
forbidden. Otherwise, a merger shall be approved unless the Board
finds that it "will not be consistent with the public interest."
The legal setting for surface carriers is similar to that governing airlines. Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act authorizes
the Interstate Commerce Commission to approve mergers, consolidations, or acquisitions of control through stock ownership if
it finds such transactions "consistent with the public interest."'
Again, ICC approval has the effect of granting immunity from
the antitrust laws.7 The Interstate Commerce Act, however, does
not contain the anti-monopoly proviso of the corresponding provision in the Federal Aviation Act. Hence, Congress may have
been more concerned with the preservation of competition among
airlines than among railroads or other surface carriers.' Yet the
Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the Commission,
in passing on applications for approval of mergers pursuant to
section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act,
must estimate the scope and appraise the effects of the curtailment of
3. Section 11 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 784 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 21 (1958), authorizes the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal
Communications Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Federal
Reserve Board to enforce compliance with § 7.
4. 72 Stat. 767 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1958).
5. 72 Stat. 770 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1958).
6. As amended, 54 Stat. 906 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(b) (1958).
7. As amended, 54 Stat. 908-09 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(11) (1958).
8. See 72 Stat. 737 (1958), 49 U.S.C. § 1302(d) (1958), which requires the
CAB to consider "competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the needs of
the . . . commerce of the United States

vision in the Interstate Commerce Act.

....

"

There is no comparable pro-
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competition which will result from -the proposed consolidation and consider them along with the advantages of improved service, safer operation, lower costs, etc., to determine whether the consolidation will assist
in effectuating the over-all transportation policy.0

The Court described this complicated task as one posing "a
problem of accommodation of the Transportation Act and the
anti-trust legislation."' 0 In other words, the Commission shall
put the antitrust and the "regulatory" aspects of each case on
two scales and decide which outweighs the other. The Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice usually intervenes before
the ICC and the CAB as representative of the public interest in
the maintenance of competition and the prevention of monopoly.

II. THE CAUSES OF THE IERGER MOVEMENT
IN TRANSPORTATION
A powerful and much-publicized railroad merger movement
has been under way since the mid-fifties. Probably its decisive
motivation is to be found in the competition of the railroads with
other forms of surface transportation. 1 ' Railroad passenger traffic
in 1961 dwindled to 2.67 percent of total passenger-miles of intercity traffic, while the private automobile accounted for almost 90
percent and the airlines for 4.5 percent. ' As to freight, the percentage of ton-miles carried by the railroads dropped from 68.19
percent in 1946 to 43.24 percent in 1961, while the percentage of
the trucks increased from 7.28 percent to 23.1 percent." Similarly,
operating revenues of the railroads fell from 70 percent of total
revenues of surface carriers in 1946 to 50 percent in 1961.'4 This
was reflected in low returns on investment for some Northeastern
roads ' (which are characterized by short hauls), losses for oth9. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 87 (19-14); see
Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173, 180 (1959).
10. McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 US. 67, 79 (19-14); see
Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173, 186 (1959). The
Supreme Court has had no opportunity to construe the merger provision of
the Federal Aviation Act.
11. Inter-mode competition is either absent or negligible for the airlines'
passenger business. It may develop with respect to air-freight.
12. 76 ICC Axx. R . 12 (1962).
13. Ibid.; 62 ICC AN. REP. 15 (1948).
14. Id. at 14; 76 ICC ANN. REP. 11 (1962).
15. The Pennsylvania Railroad had a net income of $12 million in 1962;
this was 1.34 times its fixed charges after taxes. Its recent earnings per share
were as follows: $0.93 in 1962, $0.09 in 1960, $2.23 in 1957, and $3.99 in 1956.
MAN AL 1018 (1963). The New York Central had
MooDY, TRAwsPoRTATio
a net railway operating income in 1962 but a loss in 1961. Id. at 604, 605,
states that the New York Central's earnings in the post-World War II years
"were marginal.... The large unprofitable passenger business, high terminal
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ers,'0 and receivership for the New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad.
It should also be remembered that there was no control of entry
into railroading until 1920,'" too late to be effective. Various observers have asserted that railroad plant, including parallel rail
routes and duplicate terminal facilities constructed at a time
when the railroads had a virtual transportation monopoly, is overbuilt in relation to current traffic volume and may today be
wasteful. Although these difficulties should not be generalized,
mergers appeared to offer a solution to this problem. But as the
discussion below will demonstrate, some large railroads that desire to merge are now enjoying considerable prosperity; the approach to the railroad merger movement should, therefore, proceed on a case-by-case basis.
Recent proposals for airline mergers were less complex. The
domestic trunkline industry has, since the inception of federal
regulation, been characterized by the dominance of the Big Four
(American, Eastern, T.W.A., and United).18 There are now only
seven smaller trunk lines; six others have disappeared through
mergers and consolidations.'
The clamor for further concentration in the airline industry
was brought about by the advent of the jet age, which necessitated great capital expenditures for the conversion from piston
equipment. In addition, the industry was plagued by labor disputes and, in so far as it engaged in foreign operations, by foreign
competition. Hence, it was not surprising that cost-cutting mergers were thought to provide a remedy. Significantly, however, the
majority of the Small Seven came through the adjustment period
better than the majority of the Big Four: Among the latter only
American suffered no interruption in profits, while four of the
Small Seven had a similarly favorable experience.2 0 Thus, the
costs, and a not too long average freight haul were among the factors responsible for the poor results."
16. E.g., the Erie-Lackawanna Railroad, MooDy, op. cit. supra note 15,
at 426, and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, id. at 1135.
17. Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 477, 49 U.S.C. § 1(18) (1958).
18. FULDA, COMPETITION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES, TRANSPORTATION

211, 212, 254-56 (1961).
19. All are "grandfather" carriers; i.e., they were in operation in 1938
when the Civil Aeronautics Act was passed. No new domestic trunk line has
ever been certificated. For details, see FULDA, Op. cit. .npra note 18, at 192.
225-31; Fulda, The Regulation of Aviation, 19 A.B.A. REP., SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw 377, 384, 385 (1961).
20. During the calendar-year 1961 and during the years ended June 30,
1962 and June 30, 1968, Eastern and TWA operated at a loss. United had a
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myth that small firms are necessarily and inescapably less effi-

cient than big ones was once more refuted.2 1
lI. THE INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION MERGERS
President Kennedy, in his Message to Congress on Transportation of April 5, 1962, took notice of the attempts at restructuring the railroad and aviation industries through mergers. He an-

nounced the formation of an interagency committee to "formulate general administration policies on mergers in each segment

of the transportation industry" and to "assist the Department
of Justice in developing a Government position on each merger

application for presentation before the regulatory agencies." The
group - composed of representatives of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and Labor and the Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers - was directed to examine each pending
merger on the basis of the following criteria:
(1) Effective competition should be maintained among alternative forms
of transportation, and, where traffic volume permits, between competing firms in the same mode of transportation.
(2) The goals of economical, efficient, and adequate service to the public- and reduction in any public subsidies- should be secured by the
realization of genuine economies.
(3) Affected workers should be given the assistance to make any necessary adjustments caused by the merger.2
The Committee's report was published on March 6, 1963. It

set forth the following ten questions with respect to which detailed facts will be sought in each merger:
1) Will -theproposed merger restrict effective competition in the provision of transportation services in the area affected?
2) Will the proposed merger permit an economically more efficient
use of resources, through fuller utilization, over a period of time,
loss in 1961 and also during the year ended June 30, 1962, but it had a profit
during the year ended June 30, 1963. Among the Small Seven only Northeast
operated continuously in the red. All others had net incomes during the years
ended June 30, 1962 and June 30, 1963. Braniff, Continental, Delta, and
Western earned net incomes in 19060 and 1961. National and Northwest suffered losses in 1961. CAB Omca or CARnmR Accouxts Awn STATISTICS, Am
CAnanm PniAw. L STATsrics (Dec., 1961); id. (June 30, 1963).

21. The president of Continental Airlines, one of the smallest carriers,
advocated lower costs and lower fares, suggesting that a diversion of just 4%
of private automobile traffic to airlines would double present air traffic volume. In 1961 Continental had a break-even load of 43.5% for every 100 seats,
compared to 56.5% for the rest of the industry. N.Y. Times, April 1, 1902, p.
XX18, col. 4.
22. 108 CoNG. IBr. 5987 (1962).
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7)

8)
9)
10)
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of plant and equipment and/or reduction in direct costs per unit
of output, which will reduce costs while maintaining or improving
the general quality of services offered to users?
Can the economies sought by the proposed merger be achieved by
alternatives more easily revocable which promise to be of comparable effect in accomplishing the improvement in overall efficiency?
Will the cost and quality benefits resulting from the merger be
reflected in the benefits to the public? To what extent will potential passengers or shippers retain a choice of services from this or
other modes of transportation?
Will the proposed merger, with the increased market power of the
merged carrier, have substantial undesirable repercussions on other
carriers in the industry?
Will -the proposed merger serve the long-run interests of the public and of the carriers concerned or is it merely an attempt to
meet a short-run crisis arising because of unfavorable economic
conditions in general, or a particular transitory problem?
Is the merger proposed, in part, because of the imminent failure
of one or more of the merging carriers and is it the most appropriate solution to this difficulty?
Are the legitimate interests of existing creditors and equity holders
of the merging carriers adequately protected?
Does the merger provide adequate protection and assistance to
affected employees, and take into account community employment
effects?
Will the proposed merger serve other objectives of public policy?

The Committee observed that the first question "sounds a
warning that a reduction of competition may result in reduced
benefits to users . . ." The fourth question is accompanied by
the statement that "over the long run, effective competition is

ordinarily the best guarantee of transfer of benefits." All these
questions and comments were intended to spell out the vague

merger criteria in the existing statutory and decisional law and,
perhaps, warn the agencies not to overlook that part of the Supreme Court's mandate that requires consideration of antitrust
principles as one ingredient of the "public interest." Ultimately,

the courts will have to determine whether the broad, general
statutory principles have been correctly applied in each specific
case.

IV. CURRENT RAILROAD MERGERS
During the period from 1957 through 1960 some relatively
minor railroad mergers were approved that involved claims of
large cost savings and that had provoked serious objections only
from labor. 23 By contrast, the presently pending cases involve
23. Duluth, So. S. & Atl. R.R. Merger, Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste.
M.R.R. & Wisconsin Cent. R.R., 312 I.C.C. 341 (1960); Chicago & N.W. Ry.
Purchase, Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., I.C.C. Finance Dkt. No. 21115, Oct. 13,
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major roads and vast territories; from the antitrust point of view,
these cases should be divided into two groups.
A.

THE NoRTHEASTERN ME GERS

The first group involves the railroads in the Northeast quadrant of the United States. As already noted, most of the ailing
railroads are found in that region. Hence, everyone, including the
Government's Interagency Committee, agrees that "some rationalization of the existing railroad facilities" is needed," but the
shape and scope of consolidation is a matter of controversy. The
most hotly contested proposal is, of course, the application for
approval of the Pennsylvania-N.Y. Cent. merger, filed early in
1962, which shows that on the basis of income after fixed charges
New York Central had a loss of 12,549,048 dollars in 1961 while
Pennsylvania's income, calculated on the same basis, was 3,515,586
dollars. In addition to significant improvements in the quality of
service, the parties expect 75 million dollars in annual savings,
which would be reflected in the rate structure.2 5
The Interstate Commerce Act directs the Commission, in passing upon merger applications, to consider "the effect upon the
public interest, of the inclusion, or failure to include, other railroads in the territory involved in the proposed transaction.!" Thus, the Pennsylvania-N.Y. Cent. merger, because of its enormous size, cannot be viewed as an isolated phenomenon. Indeed,
1960; Erie R.R. Merger, Delaware, L. & WJR.R., 312 I.C.C. 185, af'd sub
norm. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. United States, 189
F. Supp. 942 (E). Mich. 1960), aff'd, 366 U.S. 169 (1961); Norfolk & W. Ry.
Merger, Virginian Ry., 307 I.C.C. 401 (1959); Louisville & N.R.R. Merger,
295 I.C.C. 457, af'd sub nom. City of Nashville v. United States, 155 F. Supp.
98 (M.D. Tenn.), af'd, 355 U.S. 63 (1957); see Toledo, P. & W.R.R. Control,
295 I.C.C. 523 (1957), aff'd sub nom. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. United
States, 361 US. 173 (1959). For a discussion of these cases, see FUWDA, op. cit.
supra note 18, at 46-51. See generally Conant, Railroad Consolidations and
the Antitrust Laws, 14 STAw. L. IlEv. 489 (1962); Healy, The Merger Move-

ment in Transportation,52 Am. EcoN. REv. 436 (1962); Tucker & O'Brien,
The Public Interest in Railroad Mergers, 42 B.UL. REv. 160 (1962).

24. Statement of Assistant Attorney General William H. Orrick, Jr., in
the Pennsylvania-New York Central Merger Case, Before the Interstate Commerce Commission, October 1, 1963.
25. I.C.C. Finance Dkt. No. 21989, Application 36-38 (1962):
concentration of through freight traffic in volume and the elimination
of interchanges ... will expedite service .... Classification and rehandling will be reduced and more frequent dispatchments will be possible. Equipment delays will be reduced, and the pooling of special
equipment will increase the availability of such equipment to the
public.
26. 54 Stat. 906 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(c)(2) (1958).
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Pennsylvania Railroad officials recommended that approval of
their merger with New York Central should lead to three consolidated rail systems: The other two would evolve around the
Chesapeake & Ohio and the Norfolk & Western; the New England roads were urged to merge into a separate fourth system."
The Pennsylvania suggests that such regrouping would redress the
competitive imbalance which would otherwise be created by approval of the mammoth Pennsylvania-New York Central combination." The Interagency Committee and the Antitrust Division,
on the other hand, oppose the merger on the ground that it "would
preclude more balanced restructuring of the Eastern District
Railroads both now and in the future." According to the Committee, smaller carriers would be forced "to seek immediate resolution of their problems by merging with others on the basis of
short range expediency rather than long range benefits"; such
"hasty realignments" would not be in the public interest. Indeed,
the Committee voiced apprehensions about "the prospects and
even the continued existence of several smaller railroads" which
were not included in any merger or control proposals. Moreover,
the elimination of competition between the Pennsylvania and
New York Central would deprive "a number of important areas
and traffic flows29of satisfactory alternatives among roughly equal
rival railroads.
The case for the opposition to the Pennsylvania-New York
Central merger will be presented to the Commission in briefs to
be filed by the Antitrust Division early in 1964. The statement in
opposition quoted above is only a bare outline, which raises more
questions than it answers: First, one may wonder whether the
possible disappearance of "several smaller railroads" is an evil
per se; this may or may not be a just price for "rationalization"
which is, admittedly, necessary. Second, and more important, the
Interagency Committee and the Department of Justice, in the
very same statement, generally approved the creation of two
systems led by the Chesapeake & Ohio and the Norfolk &Western,
respectively, which the Pennsylvania itself had urged as capable
of providing "countervailing power" to its own merger. The posi27. N.Y. Times, April 20, 1962, p. 35, cols. 2, 3 (interview with president

of Pennsylvania Railroad).

28. See Healy, supra note 23, at 44-43 (1962):

Mergers, because they tend to build up firms representing great concentration of control over service, create situations more conducive to
larger firm dominance over the give and take of association rate procedures. The pressures that can be exerted by such dominant members
against independent and experimental price adjustments are very real.
29. Statement by Orrick, supra note 24.
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tion of the Department thus boils down to the proposition that
there should be "serious study" of mergers "which would not involve combining the Pennsylvania with the New York Central." '
The Examiner and the Commission will have to explore the
justification of this attitude.
The interrelationship between the three proposed Eastern systems in terms of relative competitive strength, the impact on the
parties included and those not included, and the necessity of evidence to determine whether or not a three-system plan in the
East would be consistent with the public interest appeared to
warrant consideration in one record. The Antitrust Division therefore moved for the consolidation of the Pennsylvania-N.Y. Cent.
case with the proceedings in Chesapeake & 0. Ry. - ControlBaltimore & O.R.R.3 1 and Norfolk & W. Ry. & New York, C.
& St. L.R.R. (Nickel Plate) - Merger.2 The Commission denied
this motion and approved acquisition of control of the Baltimore
& Ohio by the Chesapeake & Ohio. The majority held that the
precarious physical and financial condition of the Baltimore &
Ohio demanded an expeditious disposition, that the Chesapeake
& Ohio was able to bring about rehabilitation of the Baltimore &
Ohio, and that the two roads were "generally complementary";
a complaint by several labor organizations was dismissed by the
three-judge court3 4 and the Supreme Court affirmed 5
In the proceedings before the ICC, the acquisition of the B & 0
by the C & 0 was opposed not only by labor, but also by the
New York Central and, of course, the Antitrust Division. The
New York Central contended that it could not withstand the
estimated diversion of 41 percent of its traffic to the C & 0 - B & 0
affiliation; but the Commission thought that these estimates were
unwarranted. The New York Central abandoned its opposition
upon its application for merger with the Pennsylvania. The Department of Justice, as the statutory defendant of ICC orders.3"
first confessed error and supported the appeal to the three-judge
court on the ground that the overall impact on railroad competition in the East had not been established. When the case reached
the Supreme Court, the Department withdrew this objection and
so. Ibid.
31. 317 I.C.C. 261,264 (1962).
32. I.C.C. Finance DkL Nos. 21510-14, 21567, April 17, 1903.
33. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.-Control-Baltimore & O.R., 317 I.C.C.
261, 265-66 (1962).
34. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. United States,
221 F. Supp. 19 (E.). Mich. 1963).
35. 375 U.S. 216 (1963) (per curiam).
36. 62 Stat. 969 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2323 (1958).
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was content with a stipulation by which the parties agreed to a
reservation of jurisdiction by the Commission whereby the proceeding might be reopened by the Department or by any adversely affected carrier or by the Commission itself "when and
if necessary to obtain the imposition of additional conditions to
deal with any undue diversion of traffic from other railroads."
In fact, the Department and the Interagency Committee now
acknowledge that "ultimate integration of the C & 0 and the
B & 0, with proper conditions which may be imposed by the
Commission at the time of their projected merger, could create
a rational rail network which would permit improved service to
the public. 's7 On that point the Department and the Interagency
Committee seem to be in agreement with the Pennsylvania.
The third of the major Eastern cases, Norfolk & W. Ry. & New
3 was approved
York, C. & St. L.R.R. (Nickel Plate)- Merger,
by the Examiner on April 17, 1963 and is now pending before the
Commission. It involves the merger of the Nickel Plate into the
Norfolk & Western and a lease of the Wabash by the surviving
railroad, such lease being considered as preparatory to the ultimate merger of the Wabash into the Norfolk & Western system.
While these three railroads enjoy sound financial conditions, the
merger is motivated by the desire to bring about economies, improved operating conditions, and greater strength in the struggle
for business with the C & 0 and other railroads and other modes,
including pipelines.
The Norfolk & Western has presently no physical connection
with the Nickel Plate or the Wabash, and it does not serve any
of the points served by those carriers. The connection would be
established by purchase of the line of the Connecting Railway
Company between Columbus, Ohio and Sandusky, Ohio; this
would provide "the essential link between Norfolk & Western, on
the one hand, and Nickel Plate and Wabash on the other, making possible single-line service to many points where only jointline service is now available" and would "afford the Norfolk &
Western the direct line it has long sought for marketing its lake
cargo coal." ' Although some competition between Nickel Plate
and Wabash would be eliminated, this would have no effect on
shippers since "all cities on the proposed system with a population in excess of 50,000, other than Roanoke, Va. . . .would have
37. Statement by Orrick, supra note 24. The B & 0 expects 1964 earnings
to be "at least double" those of 1963. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 19, 1963, p.
19, Col. 2.
38. I.C.C. Finance Dkt. Nos. 21510-14, 21567, April 17, 1963.
39. Id. at 56, 57 (Examiner's Report).
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service by at least 2 rail carriers in addition to the unified line.
..
In fact, no shipper and no rail carrier appeared in opposiT4o
tion to the proposal; again, New York Central had withdrawn its
initial opposition after its merger agreement with the Pennsylvania '
Under these circumstances, the objections of the Antitrust
Division seemed unconvincing, except as to one point: The Division insisted that the Pennsylvania should be required to divest
itself of its 33.77 percent stock interest in Norfolk & Western,
and the Examiner accepted this condition, noting that this would
eliminate the interdependence of this case and the PennsylvaniaN.Y. Cent. merger. Obviously, such divestment would be indispensable lest the Pennsylvania might exercise control of or influence over the system that was designed to compete with it.
The Interagency Committee and the Antitrust Division announced on October 1, 1963 that they now favored the contemplated Norfolk &Western, Nickel Plate and Wabash combination,
subject to the additional conditions that the Erie-Lackawanna
be included and that the proceeding be reopened after completion
of the study of the New England railroads by the Department
of Commerce."' The question of the affiliation of the ErieLackawanna was explored by the ICC Examiner, who reported
that Erie-Lackawanna did not wish to join at that time." Hence,
the Interagency Committee's demand for a shot-gun marriage
seems unexplainable.
All told, the creation of two major Eastern systems headed by
the C & 0 and the N & W seems assured. It also seems reasonably
certain that there will and must be a third major Eastern system,
but whether it will be the Pennsylvania-New York Central or
some other combination cannot be predicted at this time. In any
event, it is, probably, of great significance that the decision on
the Pennsylvania-N.Y. Cent. case will come at a time when the
40. Id. at 60.
41. Id. at 69.

4-2. Id. at 109. The Pennsylvania has taken the position that it cannot
afford to surrender its investment in N & W until it has some assurance that
its own plan to merge with the New York Central will be approved. Hence,
N & W is trying to neutralize Pennsylvania's shares by placing them in a
voting trust. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 18, 1963, p. 11, Col. 2.
43. Statement of Orrick, supra note 24. The Interagency Committee believes that the New England study will show that the best interests of the
New Haven would be served by its inclusion in the N & W system. All the
New England railroads are investigating creation of a unified New England
system controlled by the N & W or the Pennsylvania. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30,
1963, p. 1, col. 5.
44. I.C.C. Finance Dkt. Nos. 21510-14, 21567 (Examiner's Report).
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two other cases will have been virtually completed. The Pennsylvania will then try to refute the argument that its merger with
the New York Central would weaken intra-mode rail competition
by pointing to the two newly created competing systems. Itmay
also try to delay ultimate sale of its investment in Norfolk &
Western pending approval of its own absorption of the New York
Central." In short, the present posture of the three related cases
may give to Pennsylvania a most helpful leverage that it would
not have had if the cases had been consolidated.
B.

OTHER RAROAD MERGERs

Outside the so-called Northeast quadrant, at the end of 1963
there were two cases in which the Antitrust Division had intervened, 46 one finally and the other tentatively decided by the ICC,
that posed the question whether profitable and competing railroads should be permitted to merge, or whether rail competition
should be preserved where its workability has been demonstrated
by prosperous carriers.
The most dramatic illustration of this problem is Seaboard
Air Line R.R. - Merger - Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 47 approved
by the ICC by a 9 to 2 vote on December 2, 1963. First, the majority found "the past earnings record of both Seaboard and Coast
Line . . .impressive," with uninterrupted dividend payments.
Likewise, their net rate of return "is above the norm for Class I
railroads," although the majority thought the returns were lower
than "in other industries or in other modes of transport. 48 Second, the merger would eliminate the present competition between
the two roads, particularly in Florida, where "the merged company would have approximately 81 percent of the railway mileage in the state. ' 49 In the six states in which the two lines
operate, where they serve 121 points in common, they would, according to the majority, control more than 54 percent of total
45. See note 42 supra.
46. See also Missouri-Pacific R.R. Control, Chicago & E. Ill. R.R., I.C.C.

Finance Dkt. No. 21755, Sept. 26, 1963 (Examiner's Recommended Decision),
which approved the acquisition of stock control of the Chicago & Eastern
Illinois by the Missouri-Pacific. The Department of Justice did not intervene.
47. I.C.C. Finance Dkt. No. 21215, Dec. 2, 1963 (Examiner's Report rec-

ommending approval filed August 24, 1962; exceptions to the report filed by
the Antitrust Division Dec. 7, 1962).
48. Id. at 35, S6. The dissent emphasized that rates of return of railroads
are lower than those of trucks because of differences in cost structures. Id.
at 156.
49. Id. at 55.
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railroad mileage compared with 34 percent for Southern, their
nearest competitor.50 The majority conceded "that there will be
a significant reduction in rail competition in Florida"' and that
88 counties in the six-state area would have no other rail line,' 2
but those counties comprised only 15 percent of the population.
In any event, the majority insisted that
with -the development of intense competition in recent years from other
modes of transport, the preservation of intramodal rail competition has

lost much of its significance in the furtherance of the overall national

53
transportation policy.

Moreover, "railroads have the basic characteristics of public utilities" and, therefore,
it is not realistic to insist that intramodal rail competition must be
preserved in all places, ai all times and under all circumstances.5 4

Having said this, the majority proceeded to discuss in great
detail the "competitive effects on other railroads through traffic
diversion,"5 5 thus indicating concern about rail competitors who
opposed the merger. Admitting that "losses to Central [of Georgia] and to the Savannah & Atlanta will . .. be substantial,"
the majority thought "that the potential injuries to these railroads . . . will be offset to a large extent by reason of their being
affiliated with Southern 5 Florida East Coast Railroad predicted a loss of five million dollars annually,sr while applicants
estimated East Coast's annual loss as amounting to 338,000 dollars; 5 the majority concluded that "a realistic estimate would
fall midway between the two extreme predictions." '
The majority's solution for the losses of other railroads is to
be found in a list of 14 "Routing and Gateway Conditions,""0
which are designed to minimi e the diversion of traffic from these
protestants. Among the most important of these conditions is, of
course, the usual general command that the surviving company
50. Ibid. The majority found that one-third of the combined total freight
traffic of the applicants was competitive and that 19.7% of that competitive
traffic would remain competitive with other railroads. Id. at 56.
51. Id. at 59.
52. Id. at 57.
58. Id. at 60.
54. Id. at 61.
55. Id. at 60-79.

56. Id. at 67, 68.
57- Id. at 69.

58. Id. at 62.
59. Id. at 71.
60. I.

app .XI.
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"shall maintain and keep open all routes and channels of trade
via existing junctions and gateways" and shall continue the "present neutrality of handling traffic inbound and outbound . . . so
as to permit equal opportunity for service to and from all lines
reaching the rails of these carriers without discrimination as to
routing or movement of traffic and without discrimination in the
arrangement of schedules or otherwise." In addition, there are
some specific conditions for the protection of specific rail competitors: For instance, the surviving Railroad
shall open new routes, and maintain thereover competitive joint rates
and just and equitable divisions thereof in connection with Norfolk
Southern Railway Company via Wilson, N.C., via Fayetteville, N.C.,
and via Raleigh, N.C., on all traffic moving between (i) all stations on the
Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company and its connections south of
Norfolk Southern's line, on the one hand, and (ii) Norfolk, Va., and
points in official territory ....
Similarly, the surviving railroad shall, as to all traffic,
be required to maintain, in connection with the Southern and its affiliates to and from the Jacksonville gateway, joint rates no higher than
the rates applicable over the lines of the merged company through that,
or any other gateway: Provided ....

that Southern and its affiliates

will extend similar reciprocity to the merged company....
There is, also, a requirement for the transfer of trackage rights
to the Central of Georgia over the tracks of the merged company
between Albany and Tifton, Ga.
Whether these conditions will preserve rail competition in the
Southeast outside of Florida is, of course, a matter of conjecture.
The Commission imposed them in order to accomplish that purpose, although it generally deprecated the importance of intramode rail competition. Perhaps, the Commission's lack of faith
in both the effectiveness of its protective conditions and in the
desirability of rail competition is unwittingly revealed in its retention of jurisdiction for five years to permit all affected parties
to ask either for modification of these conditions or for inclusion
in the merger.
The majority's affirmative case for the merger then rests on
inter-mode competition and an estimate of over 38 million dollars in annual savings, which seems to anticipate no difficulties
in obtaining authorizations for abandonment of duplicate lines.
Last, but not least, the majority relied on testimony from shippers and public officials that the merger would result in cheaper
and faster service, more flexible schedules and more direct routes,
elimination of interchanges, and the like. There was, however,
extensive testimony in opposition from rail users and communi-
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ties in the affected areas; these protestants were apprehensive
about the loss of rail competition, which would bring about less
dependable service. Naturally, the Antitrust Division's Brief presenting Exceptions to the Examiner's Recommended Report heavily emphasized the statements of the opponents, which may be
epitomized in the following testimony of a member of the Georgia
Public Service Commission:
There has never been any doubt in my mind, - and I do not believe
that any shipper who is honest with himself can hold otherwise- that
service is far better -toan industry located on two or more railroads
than it is to one "captive" upon the line of a single carrier. We have
had too many experiences before my Commission of just such "captive"
situations for it not to be conclusively demonstrated to us that com-

petition, even in regulated industries, greatly improves the service to
that area of the public able to avail itself of such competitive operations. The list of advantages of a competitive rail location ... include
such substantial benefits as more effective rate negotiations, greater
carrier concern in expediting service, better car supply and freedom
from restriction to captive "long-haul" routes. 6 '

The majority's answer was that the supporters of the merger,
numerically and by tonnage shipped, far outnumbered the opponents. Yet, even here the majority deemed it necessary to make
a concession to St. Regis Paper Company, one of the most vigorous opponents of the merger. St. Regis requested that the merger
be conditioned upon the sale or lease by the applicants of one of
their rail lines from Jacksonville to Quinlan, the site of St. Regis'
plant, to Southern Railway, and this request was granted.-' Thus,
the majority acknowledged, in this instance, that an important
shipper had the right to insist on the continued enjoyment of
competitive rail service. One may wonder why only St. Regis was
successful in vindicating this right.
Before attempting to draw conclusions from this decision, brief
reference should be made to the Examiner's recommended decision in Southern Pac. Co. - Control - Western Pac. R.R.,e
dated September 9, 1963. This involved rival applications by the
Southern Pacific and the Santa Fe; each desired to acquire stock
control of the Western Pacific. The Antitrust Division's Brief in
Opposition, filed on May 1, 1962, urged rejection of both: Southern Pacific's application was objected to because it would give
Southern a monopoly of rail transportation in two important
areas of the West; the granting of Santa Fe's application would,
61. Brief for the U.S. Dep't of Justice, pp. 85, 86 (filed December 7,1962).
62. I.C.C. Finance Dkt. No. 21215, at 84; id. Condition No. 11.
63. I.C.C. Finance Dkt. No. 21314, Sept. 9, 1963 (Examiner's Recommended Decision).
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it was asserted, have an adverse effect on other railroads. Since
all three were in sound condition, the Department viewed the
disappearance of Western Pacific as unnessary. A minority of
Western Pacific's board of directors also advocates independence
of that road." The Examiner rejected Southern Pacific's application but recommended granting Santa Fe's application because
Western Pacific by itself can prove to be no real match for the Southern
Pacific in preserving rail competition, and certainly it is reasonable to
predict that the Santa Fe alone, without the collaboration of the
Western Pacific, would be a less effective competitor of the Southern
Pacific in Central California and the San Francisco bay area. On the
other hand, the combination of the Santa Fe and the Western Pacific
will produce a sound and efficient system, which can contribute to the
growth and development of the territory involved, not only by providing needed rail service, but by preserving the essential minimum of
rail competition.65

In reaching this conclusion, the Examiner did not overlook
the competition between Santa Fe and Western Pacific for trans-

continental traffic in northern California. But he agreed with the
Santa Fe that the lessening or elimination of such competition
was overbalanced by the ability of the two railroads to give the
Southern Pacific more effective and vigorous competition than
either Santa Fe or Western Pacific can give separately. This is
the same argument invoked by Bethlehem Steel Corp. and
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. to justify their merger as a
competitive weapon against United States Steel, which was re-

jected by the court in that case."7 The Antitrust Division had attempted to rely on that precedent before the ICC.

s

It should be added, parenthetically, that the Examiner referred

to the fact that the railroads in the West have done better than

in the East and that "a considerable body of traffic important to

the economy of the region . . . moves predominantly by rail.""9
64. Wall Street Journal, Nov. 19, 1968, p. 9, col. 2. The stockholders of
Western Pacific recently voted against merging with the Santa Fe, but management maintained that the vote was advisory only. The agreement between
the two roads calls for a stockholder vote only after ICC approval. Wall Street
Journal, Jan. 20, 1964, p. 6, col. 2.
65. I.C.C. Finance Dkt. No. 21314, at 125. (Emphasis added.)
66. Id. at 31.
67. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 615-18
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
68. See Brief for the U.S. Dep't of Justice, pp. 35, 86. The Department
of Justice has recently abandoned its opposition to control of Western Pacific
by Santa Fe. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 7, 1964, p. 21, col. 5.
69. I.C.C. Finance Dkt. No. 21314, at 77.
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CONCLUSION

The Commission's decision in the Atlantic Coast Line case has,
to put-it very mildly, raised several important questions.
First: This is the first time that two prosperous and competing
carriers have been allowed to merge. The original justification
for the railroad merger movement -necessity for rationalization
because of poor or unsatisfactory results caused by oversupply
of duplicate railroad services - was, therefore, absent" The parties in this case had demonstrated that competition between railroads can work, and the protesting shippers, whose plants were
located in Florida, where the surviving railroad will have a practical monopoly of rail service, insisted on continuation of that
competition.
Second: The contrast between the Atlantic Coast Line decision and all the other cases with respect to intra-mode rail competition is breathtaking. The overriding consideration in the
Northeastern cases is the creation of at least three railroad systems none of which should be so strong as to drive the others to
the wall; in short, it seems that the ICC- with the blessing of
the Interagency Committee, which, strangely enough, has not
been heard from in the Atlantic Coast Line case - is exerting
every effort to reshape the railroads into viable competitive units.
The same policy is reflected in the Examiner's recommendation in
the Western Pao. case. In fact, that case is comparable to the
Northeastern mergers in one point: The purpose of confronting
the huge Southern Pacific with the increased competitive strength
resulting from the Western Pacific-Santa Fe combination is similar to the attempt at neutralizing the Pennsylvania-New York
Central through competing systems. In Atlantic Coast Line, on
the other hand, intra-mode rail competition is generally belittled
70. The same situation prevails in the application of the Great Northern
Pacific and Burlington Lines to acquire the properties of the Great Northern
Railway and the Chicago, Burlington &Quincy Railroads. LC.C. Finance Dkt.
Nos. 21478-80. The Brief for the Department of Justice in Opposition, filed
January 4, 1963, argues that the merger would, contrary to the public interest, create a monopoly of rail -transportation in the northern tier of states:
"The applicants are presently successfully competing with other forms of
transportation, and -there is no substantial evidence upon which to base any
finding to the contrary or that there will be effective competition by other
forms of transportation if the merger is approved," Brief for the Dep't of
Justice as Amicus Curiae, pp. 98-111, I.C.C. Finance Dkt. Nos. 21478-80;
"the proposed merger would have an adverse effect on many states, cities,
communities, and shippers," id. at 1102-29. At the time of this writing the
Examiner has not yet ruled on this application.
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as irrelevant, it is practically ended in Florida, and in the other
areas involved it is weakened to an unprecedented degree.
To add that intra-mode rail competition should not be abandoned is hardly necessary. As the testimony of the protestants
in the Atlantic Coast Line case indicates, the availability of competitive rail transportation is often necessary to assure fast and
dependable service. That is not the only advantage. It is true
that rate fixing by rate-bureaus is authorized by the so-called
Reed-Bulwinkle Act of 1948, 71 subject to approval by the ICC of
the agreement establishing the bureau and its procedure.72 That
statute also guarantees to each member of a bureau the right of
independent action 7 and to each shipper the right to appear at
bureau meetings and to be heard with regard to rate proposals
affecting his interests.7 4 Consequently, there is a serious danger
that railroads of overpowering dominance may dilute these important protections.lu
Third: No doubt, inter-mode competition is a significant consideration justifying railroad mergers that are designed to "rationalize" over-built railroad plants. Whether such competition
alone also justifies mergers of financially sound railroads that
are successfully competing not only with each other but also with
other modes of transport is, of course, another question. In any
event, the mere existence of successfully competing modes of
transportation should not be enough; there should be specific
evidence of such competition with respect to the commodities
that make up the railroads' freight traffic. Such evidence was apparently lacking in Atlantic Coast Line. Indeed, Commissioner
Webb enumerated in his dissent the nine major commodities that
represent 75 percent of the combined carload tonnage for the two
lines. Since 1946, tonnage for these commodities, which he described as "captive traffic for the railroads," increased 100 percent
and freight revenue increased more than 150 percent."0 He concluded that, in view of this strong hold on bulk- and low-rated
commodities, there was "no adequate substitute for intramodal
rail competition for the principal commodities carried by the
applicants and, thus, no reason to believe that the foundation of
applicants' prosperity is not secure. ' 1
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

62 Stat. 472 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 5(b) (1958).
For details, see FULDA, op. cit. supra note 18, at 283-305.
See id. at 295-99.
See id. at 301, 302.
See Healy, supra note 23, at 442.

76. Seaboard Airline R.R. Merger, Atlantic Coast Line, I.C.C. Finance
Dkt. No. 21215, Dec. 2, 1963, at 150, 151 (Commission's Report).
77. Id. at 152. Compare United States v. E. I. duPont de Ncmours & Co.,
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Fourth: The majority in Atlantic Coast Line suggested that
intra-mode rail competition was relatively unimportant because
the railroads are regulated. That observation would be persuasive
only if the Commission should be prepared to implement it: It
is one thing to say that the public will benefit from enormous
annual cost savings resulting from a merger; it is quite another
to make sure that these savings will actually be passed on to
the public. In other words, the only substitute for workable competition is increased regulation, and the Commission should,
therefore, be prepared to exercise its supervisory authority over
the rates of the surviving company and over rate-bureaus to
which it belongs on its own initiative in order to back up its
philosophy. Reasonable men may differ as to whether this would,
in the long run, be preferable to faith in competition, particularly
when that faith has been borne out by facts.
Fifth: The ICC is operating under a statute that contains no
concrete standards and under a Supreme Court interpretation of
that statute that only directs it to consider competition, 7 which
it has certainly done in the Atlantic Coast Line case. Hence, the
majority of the Commission cannot fairly be criticized for disregarding its statutory mandate. The attempts of the Antitrust
Division to have all the rules developed by the courts in merger
cases in the free sector of the economy made applicable to mergers
in regulated industries are not plausible. On the other hand, it is
doubtful whether more specific standards than those now governing the agencies can be framed. Perhaps, the three criteria by
which79 the Interagency Committee is to judge merger applications might be enacted as a congressional declaration of policy.
Alternatively, I suggest insertion of an anti-monopoly proviso in
section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act, similar to section
408(b) of the Federal Aviation Act. Without such an amendment,
the majority of the ICC may be expected to continue in its lukewarm or skeptical attitude toward competition, which may even
find some basis in the fact that section 5 was originally enacted
for the purpose of encouraging consolidations. 0 What is needed
351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956) (holding that a monopoly does not exist "where
there are market alternatives that buyers may readily use for their purpose").
The same criteria probably apply in merger cases under § 7 of the Clayton
Act. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962).
78. See cases cited notes 9 & 10 supra; Friendly, The Federal AdministrativeAgencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards, 75 HAm. L.

Rxv. 863, 1055, 1263 (1962).
79. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
80. See McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 80, 81 (19-4).
Section 5 of the Interstate Commerce Act was first enacted as part of the
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is an explicit reminder from Congress that competition is of crucial importance; this would create a "mood""' different from that
which now prevails. Preferably, the proposed amendment may
even go further by establishing a presumption in favor of competition, which the Commission must rebut by a clear demonstration that the increased quality and efficiency of transportation
resulting from the merger would outweigh possible advantages of
maintaining competition.8
The change of attitude suggested here implies an additional
inquiry described in the third question posed by the Interagency
Committee: Are there alternative methods to achieve the economies sought by mergers? The Commission has, apparently, never
bothered to investigate that question, the pursuit of which seems
essential in helping to maintain the rebuttable presumption in
favor of competition.
V. AIRLINE MERGERS
The majority of the past airline mergers involved smaller
trunk lines with complementary route structures;," their competitive strength vis-a-vis the Big Four was thus increased in a manner comparable to that resulting from the mergers of independent
automobile manufacturers. A notable exception was the UnitedCapital merger, which was approved on the ground that Capital
was on the brink of bankruptcy and would
have gone out of
84
business if the merger had been disapproved.
The attempt at a radical revamping of the domestic trunk
lines by merging Eastern and American was unsuccessful. On
November 27, 1962, Hearing Examiner Ralph L. Wiser recommended denial of the application for approval. On June 20, 1963
the CAB announced "tentative" disapproval, without opinion.
Subsequently, American advised Eastern that it terminated the
Transportation Act of 1920, which authorized the Commission to consolidate
all railroads into a limited number of systems. Act of Feb. 28, 1920, ch. 91,
41 Stat. 456.
81. Compare Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951).
82. This view was recommended by the Attorney General's National Com-

mittee to Study the Antitrust Laws,

ATT'Y GEN. NAT'L Comrm. ANTITRUST
REP. 269, 270 (1955), which relied on the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice

Douglas in McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 821 U.S. 67, 92 (1944). The
same philosophy is reflected in H.R. No. 82, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (introduced by Congressman Celler); H.R. No. 2142, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1958);
HR. No. 9762, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
83. Fulda, The Regulation of Aviation, 19 A.B.A. REP., SECTION or ANTITRUST LAW 384 (1961).
84. Order of the CAB affirmed in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 303
F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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merger agreement, and the Board then issued a brief order dismissing the case.
The Examiner found that the merger would result in creating
a monopoly in the Boston-New York (70 percent of the passengers in 1960), New York-Washington (67 percent), New YorkProvidence (97 percent), Chicago-Indianapolis (94 percent),
Hartford-New York (95 percent), Baltimore-New York (87 percent), and Louisville-New York (94 percent) markets and, generally, in trunkline air transportation in the Northeastern area of
the United States. 5 The Examiner also found that the transaction
would not be consistent with the public interest: The merged
carrier's routes would extend over the entire United States except
the Northwest; 20 of the 23 large traffic hubs and 28 of the 38
medium hubs would be served. These points account for 76.8 percent of domestic air passengers. The merged carrier would have
at the outset
32.9% of total olerating revenue, 84.4% of revenue passengers, 33.6%
of revenue passenger-miles, 39.7% of freight ton-miles, 33.3% of passenger 'revenue, 36.3% of total investment, 36.2% of total assets,
35.6% of promotion and sales expense and 32.4% of advertising
expense.Se

The resources of the merged carrier "would enable it with little
difficulty to blanket particular competitive segments with schedules and drive its competitors out of the market."8' In short, the
case presented
a major fork in -he road. Decision to approve takes a road leading to
the strong possibility of a domestic trunkline industry drastically reconstituted into something like a three- or four-carrier membership- an
irreversible step which has not been established as justified. Decision
against approval leads to probabilities of an industry with two or three
times as many carriers as likely in the event of approval.8 8

Significantly, the Examiner did not find evidence of business necessity for the merger.To be sure, American was and is a very strong
85. American Airlines, Inc. Merger, Eastern Airlines, Inc., C.A.B. DkL
No. 13355, Nov. 27, 1962, at 12, 13, 62, 73 (Examiner's Report).
86. id. at 63.
87. Id. at 67.
88. Id. at 70. A proposal -to reduce all other trunk lines to four was published in the N.Y. Times, Feb. 4,1962, p. XX1, col 6. The Examiner followed
the findings and conclusions of two preceding studies of the case, although he
did not cite them. STAFF OF SUBcomm. No. 5, HouSE CoNZI. ON TME JUDIciARY, 87TH CONG., 2D SESS., PROPOSED MERGER OF EAsmm

Ar Lm-s &D

A.rmicw Am Lnws (Comm. Print 1962); Barber, Airline Mergers, Monopoly,
and the (JAB, 28 J.Am L. & Com. 189 (1962). See also City of Houston v.

CAB, 317 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (reversing the Board's denial of Houston's

request to intervene in the merger proceeding).
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carrier, but Eastern, although financially sound after 25 years of
continuous profits, has suffered reverses since 1960.89 A less toughminded hearing officer might well have succumbed to that. Mr.
Wiser concluded, however, that Eastern's recent losses were attributable not to excessive competition, but to delayed acquisition of jets and uneconomic scheduling. Moreover, he did not
believe that there was "a causal relationship between number
of competitors and expenses per revenue ton-mile"; 0 thus, he
viewed Eastern's difficulties as transitory." He also rejected as
unsubstantiated and speculative the savings claimed to result
from the merger. The expected increase in profits would be at the
expense of other carriers rather than caused by increased efficiency.9 2 There seemed to be no suggestion of lower fares.
The nub of the argument with regard to savings was Eastern's
assertion that it would save ten large jets which it would have
to acquire as a separate carrier. The Examiner's answer was that
reduction in flying hours could be and actually had been accomplished by independent action of the separate carriers and that,
in the long run, procurement would depend on public demand."
All told, the contrast between the "mood" of this decision,
which the majority of the CAB seemed ready to adopt, and the
approach of the ICC in the Atlantic Coast Line case is striking,
Indeed, Mr. Wiser extolled the advantages of a competitive air
transport system as encouraging "competitive ferment," "cost
rivalry," and striving for "uninterrupted service.' This philosophy is reflected in numerous Board decisions" and, of course, in
the anti-monopoly proviso of section 408(b) of the Federal Aviation Act. Mr. Wiser's finding that the proposed Eastern-American
merger would violate that proviso compelled him to determine
89. See note 20 supra.

90. American Airlines, Inc. Merger, Eastern Airlines, Inc., C.A.B. Dkt. No.
18355, Nov. 27, 1962, at 25 (Examiner's Report).
91. Id. at 51-56. The president of Eastern recently announced that Eastern
intended -to break even in 1964 and expected profits in 1965. Wall Street Journal, Jan. 6, 1964, p. 5, col. 2. The reduced profits of the industry as a whole, and
the losses of some of its members, were found to have been caused by labor
disputes, adverse publicity as to the Lockheed Electra engine, and a jet-purchase
program geared to an anticipated growth in traffic -that did not materialize.
American Airlines, Inc. Merger, Eastern Airlines, Inc., C.A.B. Dkt. No. 13355,
Nov. 27, 1962, at 30, 31 (Examiner's Report).
92. Id. at 51.
93. Id. at 48-50.
94. Id. at 59, 60 (quoting from Delta's Brief in Opposition to the proposed merger).

95. See
TATION

FuLDA, COM1PETITION IN THE REGuxATED INDUSTRm,

211-21,226-28, 240-47 (1961).

TRA! SOR-
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the relevant markets in which the combined company would
operate, and, with respect to that issue, he quoted extensively
from the Supreme Court's decision in Brown Slhe Co. v. United
States6 Accommodation between regulation and competition in
aviation thus seems to gravitate in the direction of the latter, at
least by comparison with surface transportation.
Yet, we should not forget that the regulatory job of the CAB is
child's play by contrast with the task of the ICC: Eleven 7 domestic trunk lines with relatively little competition from surface carriers for passenger traffic 98 are much easier to supervise than all
railroads, domestic water carriers, and thousands of interstate
truckers, engaged in fierce rivalry with each other. At least, the
maintenance of workable competition between the domestid
trunk airlines has been facilitated by the Board's consistent refusal
to certify new trunk lines.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion of recent merger proposals by railroads and airlines demonstrates once more the difficult interplay
between competition and regulation. There may, of course, be
disagreement with the bias in favor of competition demonstrated
in these pages; but there can be no disagreement with the conclusion that under our present legal system and political realities,
competition and regulation are not and cannot be mutually exclusive opposites, but complementary devices. The task of keeping these two elements in proper balance 0 0 remains as one of the
most challenging problems of public control.
96. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
97. Northeast, one of the eleven, has been saved from bankruptcy by the
Board's decision to permit Hughes Tool Company to acquire control of Northeast. Toolco-Northeast Control Case, E-18470, C.B., June 19, 1902, aff'd
sub nom. National Airlines v. CAB, 321 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir. 1903). Its future
as an independent carrier may depend on the outcome of its struggle to keep
the profitable New York-Florida route: On July 23, 1903, the Board refused
to renew the temporary certificate of Northeast for New York-Florida service,
thus leaving that market to Eastern and National. The decision was hailed by
Eastern as relieving it from excessive competition, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1903,
p. 21, col. 4, and it may have been the Board's consolation price to Eastern's
defeat in the merger case. Northeast's appeal is pending in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which ordered extension of North-

east's authority for Florida service until final disposition of the appeal.

98. As to air freight, the airlines are not yet competitive with surface
carriers.
99. The proposed merger of Pan American and TWA has been abandoned.
The principal impact of that merger would have been in foreign markets,
because Pan Am has no domestic operations. It may have strengthened U.S.
competition with foreign carners.
100. FuLDA, op. cit. supra note 95, at 459.

